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Transportation system resilience has been the subject of several recent studies. To 
assess the resilience of a transportation network, however, it is essential to model its 
interactions with and reliance on other lifelines. In this work, a bi-level, mixed-integer, 
stochastic program is presented for quantifying the resilience of a coupled traffic-power 
network under a host of potential natural or anthropogenic hazard-impact scenarios. A 
two-layer network representation is employed that includes details of both systems. 
Interdependencies between the urban traffic and electric power distribution systems are 
captured through linking variables and logical constraints. The modeling approach was 
applied on a case study developed on a portion of the signalized traffic-power 
distribution system in southern Minneapolis. The results of the case study show the 
importance of explicitly considering interdependencies between critical infrastructures 
in transportation resilience estimation. The results also provide insights on lifeline 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Transportation networks are critical lifelines for a community, essential to the 
functioning of society and the viability of its economy. Similar to other civil 
infrastructure systems (e.g. electric power, telecommunications and water supply), 
transportation systems are vulnerable to a host of hazards and other less extreme causes 
of disruption. Thus, having a resilient transportation infrastructure system, i.e. one that 
has both the innate capacity and adaptive capacity to withstand the impact of one of 
various types of hazard events, is critical. In a disaster event, a well-operating 
transportation system is also crucial to search and rescue efforts, accessibility by 
emergency personnel, evacuation and sheltering, distribution of essential supplies, and 
the ability to respond quickly to acute medical needs. After a disaster, a functioning 
transportation network allows a community to repair damaged infrastructures and 
recover economically. 
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), resilience is 
defined as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand 
and recover rapidly from disruptions.” They consider that disruptions may be generated 
deliberately, accidental or from natural occurrences. Transportation system resilience 
and related measures of risk, vulnerability, reliability and others have been studied in 
several works. These works have focused on a range of transportation modes, such as 
cargo, roadway, and aviation. A comprehensive review of approximately 200 related 







consider the transportation system in isolation, overlooking its dependencies on, or 
interconnections with, other critical infrastructures. In fact, continued operation of 
these systems has come to rely on other infrastructure systems, especially power and 
telecommunications. Even co-location with, for example, water supply and sewage 
systems creates interconnections. These interactions can cause cascading failures that 
propagate from one system to another and back.  
Studying the resilience of a transportation system in isolation may create 
erroneous conclusions. This is because resilience estimates taken in isolation likely will 
not account for damage and/or repairs taken to the other interacting systems under a 
damage scenario. To address this, one might anticipate the impacts of the damage event 
and predict a likely repair schedule. However, it may be necessary in developing the 
repair schedule for the second infrastructure to consider damage and repair schedules 
designed for the transportation system, since moving equipment and personnel over a 
geographic area may be required. Additionally, adaptive actions taken in the immediate 
aftermath of a disruption event affecting the transport system would need to be 
identified with limited knowledge about other supporting lifelines. Such adaptive 
actions are a crucial component of resilience estimation. Thus, to assess the resilience 
of a transportation network, it is essential to model its interactions with these other 
lifelines. 
In this thesis, a mathematical modeling approach is proposed for computing and 
maximizing the resilience of a coupled transportation-power network. Specifically, a 







goal of maximizing resilience in terms of performance of the transportation system. 
Interdependencies and other interactions are modeled through linking variables and 
logical constraints. The model explicitly recognizes the inherent stochasticities in the 
impact of future hazard events from possible multiple hazard types. This bi-level 
framework with stochastic program at the upper level can be viewed as an extension of 
an earlier multi-hazard resilience computation methodology described in (Faturechi 
and Miller-Hooks, 2014, for a traffic network) to multiple interdependent networks.  
The upper level seeks an optimal allocation of limited mitigation, preparedness 
and response resources to obtain an efficient resource allocation plan across systems 
and estimate maximum achievable resilience level given traffic flows through network 
arcs. The upper level is formulated as a two-stage, stochastic, mixed-integer, nonlinear 
program with an objective of minimizing total system travel time. Travel times are 
estimated in the lower level assuming a traffic equilibrium will be achieved under given 
resilience enhancing actions (i.e., mitigation/preparedness and recovery decisions) 
from the upper level. Maximum coupled-system resilience is obtained when a 
Stackelberg equilibrium is reached between the upper- and lower-level problems 
(Gibbons, 1992). 
The two-stage stochastic programming framework adopted herein captures 
differences in information availability between pre-event and post-event decision-
making. In the first stage, decisions on preparedness and mitigation actions are chosen, 
while in the second stage, recourse actions are taken for the realized hazard event using 







of this coupled network that are vulnerable to damage include traffic signal and 
roadway links (traffic network), and also substations, and transmission lines (power 
network). Recourse actions, such as repairing a downed power line, can be applied 
across the networks; however, their availability may necessitate the need for an open 
path along which a repair crew can travel to reach the affected equipment. Hazard type 
and impact uncertainty is modeled through the generation of multiple disaster event 
impact scenarios that are designed to reflect different levels of damage to the various 
elements of the coupled system. 
Next (Chapter 2), models that consider interdependence between a 
transportation system and other critical infrastructures are synthesized, and a review of 
general approaches for modeling interdependent systems is provided. This is followed 
by the mathematical model proposed herein for transportation resilience computation 
and maximization in a coupled traffic-power system (Chapter 3). Using previously 
developed techniques and established theories, the bi-level program is reduced to an 
equivalent single-level program (also in Chapter 3). The proposed method was applied 
to a case study involving a portion of the signalized traffic-power distribution system 









Chapter 2: Interdependencies and the Literature 
 
Interactions between transportation and other infrastructure systems can be one-way 
(dependencies) or two-way (interdependency). Rinaldi et al. (2001) categorized 
interdependencies between critical lifelines into four general types: physical, cyber, 
geographic, and logical. Consider the following examples in the context of 
transportation applications. The safe and uninterrupted operation of a railway system 
relies on continuous communications between trains and the control room, creating a 
cyber interdependency. Moreover, operation of both the railway and communications 
networks depend on stable electric power, and the viability of the power network 
depends on the communications network, producing physical, direct and indirect 
interdependencies. In the context of a roadway network, a water-main break arising 
below the surface of a roadway may cause traffic congestion, further prolonging the 
period before which repair teams can reach affected areas. This produces greater and 
more widespread congestion and, thus, geographic interdependency. Logical 
interdependencies in the context of transportation systems may arise, for example, 
where substitutable travel modes exist. Some interactions arise from the disaster 
circumstance; while other interactions exist during normal operations due to physical 
connections or other dependencies. These interactions generally arise between 
transportation and other critical lifelines, including not only power, communications, 
and water/waste water, but also supply chains, emergency-repair services, and health 
care, among others. Figure 1 illustrates these and other interdependencies between 








Figure 1-Interdependencies between transportation and other critical lifelines 
While discussion of resilience in the literature has increased tremendously in 
recent years, few works have focused on specifics of the interactions between a 
transportation system and other lifelines. The succeeding paragraphs describe the 
specific causes of interconnectivity with power, telecommunications, water supply or 
wastewater networks, and seek to uncover issues that may arise due to such 
interactions.  
Power is vital for ensuring continuity of operations of many transportation 







railroad networks (Zhang et al., 2014, Lee et al., 2007, Santos-Reyes et al., 2015), 
airports (Procyk and Dhariwal, 2010), and signalized traffic intersections (Bigger et al., 
2009, Procyk and Dhariwa, 2010, Kajitani and Sagai, 2009) on electric power. On the 
other hand, power systems can be affected by disturbances in transportation systems. 
Consider, for example, interruptions in power in the context of a railroad system. 
Delays in delivery of coal needed for electric-power generation at power plants will 
arise due to power loss, causing failure to railroad control and highway-railroad 
crossing signals. These delays affect the restoration of the power network, which is 
required for reducing travel delays. Such interdependencies between roadway and 
power networks were noted in several events that arose during the 2004 hurricane 
season in Florida, and are studied in (Bigger et al., 2009).  
Communication also plays a very important role in operations of many 
transportation systems as is discussed in several works. Specifically, railroad and air 
transport systems rely heavily on functioning communication systems (Bigger et al., 
2009, Procyk and Dhariwal, 2010). Moreover, coordinating emergency response and 
post-event repair operations also requires communication between units (Bigger et al., 
2009, Procyk and Dhariwal, 2010). The role of backup systems, such as radios (Procyk 
and Dhariwal, 2009), in alleviating communication outages is discussed in the context 
of structural closures and contraflow operations. 
Water and wastewater systems also depend on the transportation system. This 
dependence arises from a need for supplies of chemicals for water/wastewater 







2010). On the other hand, a water main break can lead to flooding, which may cause 
roadway closures (Procyk and Dhariwal, 2010), and the use of roadways is required for 
repairing the water pipelines. 
A comprehensive review of over 200 articles on the general modeling of 
interconnected critical infrastructure systems is given in (Ouyang, 2014). This work 
classifies the various approaches as: empirical, agent-based, system dynamic, 
economic theory, network and others. 
In the context of transportation related interdependency studies, empirical 
methodologies, i.e. using existing data from previous events or expert judgment, were 
employed in (Bigger et al., 2009; Procyk and Dhariwal, 2010; Huang et al., 2014). By 
example, Bigger et al. (2009) gather data from interviews with owners and operators 
of major critical lifelines. Their main aim was to reveal key interdependencies among 
energy, communication, water/wastewater, and transportation during the 2004 
hurricane season in Central Florida. A disadvantage of such empirical models is their 
strong dependence on subjective opinion and accurate reporting. 
Alternative quantitative approaches to studying interdependencies involving 
transportation systems have been proposed. These include: simulation-, graph 
theoretic-, mathematical modeling-, and network flow-based methodologies. 
Simulation-based methods were employed in (Zhang et al., 2014; Johansson 
and Hassel, 2010; Cui et al., 2014; Arcidiacono et al., 2012) for assessing the impact 
of interactions between transportation and other systems. Zhang et al. (2014) employed 







and communication systems. They evaluated the Shanghai urban rail transit network’s 
vulnerability using a concept of dependent intensity within a framework of master and 
slave networks. Functionality loss of this rail system was evaluated for three different 
types of failure in each master network (communication and power) for a range of 
dependent intensities. Simulation runs were conducted to determine the critical nodes 
of power and communication networks based on rail functionality loss. Johansson and 
Hassel (2010) evaluated disruptions on the vulnerability of interconnected 
infrastructure networks through the simulation of node and edge removal. Connections 
are modeled through dependency links between infrastructure network representations. 
A case study of a hypothetical railway system modeled on a real railway network in 
Sweden was conducted. This railway system depends on: electrical in-feed, auxiliary 
power, telecommunication, and traction power systems. Critical system components 
and critical geographic locations were identified based on loss of origin-destination 
connectivity in the railway system. Their modeling approach captures the temporal 
aspects of repair time and buffer capacity. Cui et al. (2014) studied the impacts of 
hurricanes on transportation and health care systems. They conducted simulation runs 
to estimate the effect of different strategies for recovering roadways and regaining 
access to hospitals. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) proposed a methodology to measure the 
resilience index for transportation system during a disaster considering its 
interdependencies with building systems. In this paper, the functionality of 
transportation system is defined as post-disaster capacities over pre-disaster capacities 







proposed method is implemented in a software and has been applied to a case study of 
San Francisco Bay area. 
Zhang and Peeta (2011) employed a multi-layer infrastructure network 
framework to study interdependencies between infrastructure systems. In such a 
framework each infrastructure is modeled as a layer containing multiple geographical 
regions, where a transport agent associated with each infrastructure is responsible for 
moving commodities produced within the system between different regions. 
Interactions between infrastructures are captured through a market-based economic 
approach employing computable general equilibrium (CGE) theory. Substitution 
relationships between different infrastructures with benefits for producers and 
households are modeled for the case of a supply reduction in one commodity under an 
interruption. Another multi-layer representation and mathematical modeling 
perspective in taken in (Gong et al., 2014) in studying the optimal restoration strategy 
for supply chains using a multi-objective optimization approach. The supply chain, 
power system and telecommunication networks are each modeled as a layer and 
interdependencies between them are also represented through logical constraints. In 
their model, the transportation network is embedded within the supply chain layer. 
Cavdaroglu et al. (2013) proposed a mixed integer formulation for integrating 
restoration and scheduling plans to restore services to interrupted interdependent 
systems (described generically) in the aftermath of a disruption. Restoration decisions 
are taken and are assigned to an available work group. They tested their model on a 







A multicommodity network flow model of the interconnected power, 
telecommunication, and subway networks is proposed in (Lee et al., 2007). Each of 
these networks is modeled as an individual system using a deterministic mathematical 
modeling approach wherein system interactions are represented through constraints. 
Five types of dependencies were studied: input (one system feeds the other), mutual 
(interdependence), shared (need for same resource), exclusive OR, and co-located. The 
approach was applied on a case study involving the subway system in Lower Manhattan 
under a single, hypothetical disruption scenario. The aim of the model is to propose an 
optimal restoration plan. A plan for the post-event placement of power shunts was 
identified for bringing services temporarily back on line under the given scenario.  
One can categorize these examples of interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures as operational or infrastructural failure interdependencies. Another type 
of interdependency between lifelines occurs when restoration actions in one system 
affect the restoration efforts in another (Sharkey, Nurre, Nguyen, Chow, Mitchell, and 
Wallace, 2015). For example, debris that is left post-event may block roadway links 
near a power substation; thus, preventing repairs to that substation. Restoration of 
power depends on the restoration of the roadway links. Sharkey, Nurre, et al. (2015) 
classified the restoration interdependencies into two broad categories: time-based 
(traditional precedence, effectiveness precedence, option precedence, and time-
sensitive options) and resource-based (competition for resources). The first category 
concerns post-event repair scheduling and the effects of timing repairs on operations of 







Table 1- Literature review summary 
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Qual Bigger et al. (2009)   
Quan Cui et al. (2014)   
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 Finally, Sharkey, Cavdaroglu, Nguyen, Holman, Mitchell, and Wallace (2015) 
proposed mathematical models to study the potential for centralized and decentralized 
decision making to impact system recovery. In the former case, all systems are 
considered simultaneously with one governing decision-maker who seeks optimal 
multi-system performance using a joint objective function; while in the latter case, 
decisions are taken unilaterally for each network. Their models were employed on two 
case studies to study the role of information sharing in system restoration efficiency 
with a focus on power, telecommunication, transportation, and water/wastewater 
infrastructures. Transportation was considered only in terms of emergency response 
generated from police and fire stations to population centers. Interdependencies 
associated with restoration activities are captured through logical constraints in the 
models. Average percentage of disrupted service restored across the infrastructures 
serves as a performance metric. 
Table 1 synthesizes the inclusion of transportation systems in critical lifeline 







interdependencies have only established the types of interdependencies between 
transportation systems and other critical lifelines and provided examples for each type. 
A small subset of these works have proposed modeling approaches to study these 
interdependencies. However, most only conduct a vulnerability analysis to identify 
weaknesses due to interdependencies. 
 This review of the literature revealed six studies on transportation system 
resilience quantification given its reliance on and interdependencies with other critical 
lifelines. While these works provide methods that consider interconnections between 
some infrastructures and transportation systems, none considers increasing resilience 
of such an interconnected system through taking preparedness/mitigative actions in an 
uncertain environment. This work takes a step toward filling this gap. Specifically, it 
incorporates both the network’s inherent coping capacity and post-event adaptability 
(two key components of resilience) in resilience measurement and maximization for 
the coupled signalized roadway-power network. The resilience measure is based on 
total travel time assuming drivers will seek alternative, shorter paths when intersection 
delays or roadway link blockages arise, thus accounting for the impact of power 
outages and their remediation at the intersections. Interdependencies arising from the 
need for transport access for repair crews in the power distribution network are 
included. Moreover, the approach is multi-hazard and accounts for the uncertainties 









Chapter 3: Problem Formulation 
 
The problem of computing the maximum resilience level of the coupled traffic-power 
system is formulated in this chapter using concepts of a bi-level formulation.  A single-
level equivalent problem is presented; its equivalency is discussed. Before proceeding 
to the formulation, nomenclature is defined. The notation assumes that only one 
mitigation, one preparation and one response action can be taken on any node or link 
element. The latter need not be restrictive as sets of actions can be bundled. The term 
signal refers to the traffic controller equipment, including the set of traffic lights 
controlling the movement of vehicles through a single intersection. If power is lost to 
the intersection or any portion of this equipment is damaged, the entire intersection 
control system is assumed to go down. 
  
Parameters  
 cost of implementing preparedness action on substation ∈  
 
 cost of implementing preparedness action on signal ∈
 
 
 cost of implementing preparedness action on link ∈  
 
 cost of implementing recovery activity on substation ∈
 
 
 cost of implementing recovery activity at signal ∈  
 
 cost of repairing link ∈  
 








 cost of implementing police enforcement at signal ∈  
 _  cost of implementing recovery activity on substation ∈
 if preparedness action is taken on the substation 
 _  cost of implementing recovery activity at signal ∈  if 
preparedness action is taken on the signal 
 _  cost of repairing link ∈  if preparedness action is 
taken on the link 
 
 preparedness-recovery activity relationship (=1 if 
recovery activity taken on substations is affected by 
preparedness action taken on substations and =0 
otherwise) 
 
 preparedness-recovery activity relationship (=1 if 
recovery activity taken on signal is affected by 
preparedness action taken on signal and =0 otherwise) 
 
 preparedness-recovery activity relationship (=1 if repair 
of link is affected by preparedness action taken on link 
and =0 otherwise) 
 
 available budget 
 
 capacity of link ∈  
 ∆  capacity reduction in link ∈  if no preparedness or 
recovery activity is taken on link  
 ∆  capacity reduction in link ∈  if preparedness action 
is taken on link  
 
 demand for O-D (Origin-Destination) pair  
 _  travel delay along link ∈  if outage at signal at 
terminating end of link  
 
 travel delay along link ∈  if outage at signal at 
terminating end of link  with police reinforcement 
 ,  path-arc incidence (=1 if path ∈  uses link ∈  







 ∆ ,  path-arc incidence (=1 if path ∈  uses link ∈  
for reaching node ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 ,  link-signal incidence (=1 if signal ∈  is at terminating 
end of link ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 ,  substation-feeder incidence (=1 if substation ∈  
provides electricity for feeder ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 ,  transmission line-substation-feeder-signal incidence 
defined for each pair of transmission line ∈  and ∈
, where  can be either a substation, , feeder, , or 
signal,  (=1 if transmission line  starts from either 
substation ∈ ⊆  or feeder ∈ ⊆ , -1 if it ends 
at either feeder ∈ ⊆  or signal ∈ ⊆ , and =0 
otherwise) 
 ,  feeder-signal incidence (=1 if feeder ∈  provides 
electricity for signal ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 ,  substation-intersection incidence (=1 if substation ∈  
is located at node ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 ,  transmission line-intersection incidence (=1 if 
transmission line ∈  originates from or terminates at 
node ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 ,  signal-intersection incidence (=1 if signal ∈  is 
located at node ∈  and =0 otherwise) 
 
 free flow travel time of link ∈  
 ( ) state of substation ∈ , indicating whether substation 
can provide feeders with electricity under scenario ∈  
(=1 if it can provide electricity and =0 otherwise) 
 ( ) state of signal ∈ , indicating whether signal is 
damaged under scenario ∈  (=1 if it is not damaged 
and =0 otherwise) 
 _ ( ) state of main transmission line ∈ , indicating 
whether main transmission line is damaged under 








 _ ( ) state of secondary transmission line ∈ , indicating 
whether secondary transmission line is damaged under 
scenario ∈  (=1 if it is not damaged and =0 
otherwise) 
 ( ) state of link ∈ ,indicating whether link is damaged 





( ) new (updated) capacity of link ∈  given resilience 
enhancing actions taken on link  under scenario ∈  
 ( ) indicates whether signal ∈  is working under 
scenario ∈  (=1 if it is working and =0 otherwise) 
 ( ) indicates whether link ∈  is working under scenario ∈  (=1 if it is working and =0 otherwise) 
 _ ( ) indicates whether feeder ∈  receives power from its 
upstream substation under scenario ∈  (=1 if it 
receives power and =0 otherwise) 
 _ ( ) indicates whether the main transmission line in feeder  ∈  is operational under scenario ∈  (=1 if it is 
operational and =0 otherwise) 
 _ _ _ ( ) indicates whether feeder ∈  has power along its main 
transmission lines under scenario ∈  (=1 if it has 
power and =0 otherwise) 
 _ ( ) indicates the state of a secondary transmission line that 
connects feeder ∈  to signal ∈  under scenario ∈  (=1 if it is operational and =0 otherwise) 
 _ _ _ ( ) indicates whether signal ∈  has power under scenario ∈  (=1 if it has power and =0 otherwise) 
 ℎ ( ) binary variable that indicates whether all links along 
path ∈  from repair crew depot to node ∈  are 







all links along path ∈  are open and =0 otherwise) 
 ( ) post-disaster travel time along link ∈  under scenario ∈  
 
 post-disaster total travel time (expected value over all 
scenarios ∈ ) 
 ( ) post-disaster traffic flow on link ∈   under scenario ∈  
 ( ) post-disaster minimum travel time for O-D pair ∈  
under scenario ∈ , given all resilience-enhancing 
actions that were taken  
  ( ) travel time of path ∈  for O-D pair ∈  under 
scenario ∈  
 ( ) traffic flow on path ∈  for O-D pair ∈  under 
scenario ∈  
 
Resilience enhancing decision variables 
 indicates whether a preparedness action is taken on 
substation ∈  (=1 if preparedness action is taken on 
substation  and =0 otherwise) 
 
 indicates whether a preparedness action is taken at 
signal ∈  (=1 if preparedness action is taken on 
signal  and =0 otherwise) 
 
 indicates whether a preparedness action is taken on link ∈  (=1 if preparedness action is taken on link  and 
=0 otherwise) 
 ( ) indicates whether a recovery activity is taken on 
substation ∈  (=1 if recovery activity is taken on 
substation  and =0 otherwise) 









( ) indicates whether a recovery activity is taken on link ∈  (=1 if recovery activity is taken on link  and =0 
otherwise) 
 _ ( ) indicates whether a recovery activity is taken on main 
transmission line ∈  (=1 if recovery activity is taken 
on main transmission line  and =0 otherwise) 
 _ ( ) indicates whether a recovery activity is taken on 
secondary transmission line ∈  (=1 if recovery 
activity is taken on secondary transmission line  and =0 
otherwise) 
 ( ) indicates whether police are assigned to regulate the 
intersection movements for intersection associated with 
signal ∈  (=1 if recovery activity is taken and =0 
otherwise) 
 
3.1 Problem Formulation 
With the traffic network as the focus, the objective of maximizing resilience is given 
in terms of total travel time. Specifically, resilience is defined as the ratio of pre-event 
total travel time (defined in terms of vehicular travel time under pristine conditions) to 
post-event total travel time (defined in terms of mean vehicular travel time taken over 
all possible hazard scenarios): 
Resilience = pre − event total travel timepost − event total travel time 
Total travel times are weighted by demand for each O-D pair. Since the 
numerator is a constant, it can be omitted from the objective function (1). The objective 
is, thus, rewritten in terms of minimizing the expected total system travel time for all 







 = ( ) ( )∈  (1)
The objective is subject to constraints associated with: the status of both power 
distribution and traffic signal systems, budget, traffic link flows, roadway link 
capacities, KKT (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) conditions, roadway link repair needs, and 
repair operation limitations due to interdependencies affecting restoration. The 
remainder of this section is dedicated to the description and formulation of these 
constraints. 
3.1.1 Post-event power distribution - traffic signal status  
Auxiliary constraints (2)-(8) determine whether the traffic signals will be operative 
post-event given direct damage, damage to the power distribution components that 
support them, and preparedness or recovery actions taken to mitigate the impact of such 
damage should it occur. Such actions include, for example, hardening roadway links, 
placing generators at substations and providing alternative energy (such as solar) for 
traffic signal controllers. 
Backup power generators generate less power than a typical substation. 
Consequently, a generator that serves as a temporary replacement for a substation will 
support only a subset of its associated feeders. By constraints (2), a feeder  has 
power under scenario s if one or more of the following conditions hold: substation e 
that feeds f is undamaged under scenario s (first term on the right-hand side), a 
preparedness action is taken to provide backup power generation at substation e in case 







event, i.e. ( ) = 1. If any of these conditions hold, then _ ( ) = 1 and 
feeder f can receive power from its substation. For f not in  (constraints (3)), f is 
operational only if the substation is undamaged or repaired. 1 − _ ( )  
= 1 − , ( )∈ 1 − ,∈ 1 − , ( )∈ , ∀∈ , ∈ , 
(2)
1 − _ ( ) = 1 − , ( )∈ 1 − , ( )∈ , ∀ ∈ − , ∈ . (3)
A similarly structured set of constraints (4) can be formulated to determine the 
state of the main transmission line under scenario s that emanates from a substation. If 
the main transmission line is undamaged or repaired, and the feeder can obtain power 
from its substation (i.e. _ ( ) = 1), then it is able to distribute power, i.e. 
_ _ _ ( ) = 1 (constraints (5)). 
1 − _ ( )
= 1 − − , ∙ _ ( )∈ 1
− − , _ ( )∈ ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ . 
(4)
_ _ _ ( ) = _ ( ) _ ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (5)
Next, constraints are required to ensure that end users receive power only if 
transmission lines between the main transmission line and the end users are operational 







everything is in place for power at the signal (constraints (7)). 1 − _ ( )
= 1 − − , ∙ _ ( )∈ 1
− − , _ ( )∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . 
(6)
_ _ _ ( ) = ,∈ _ _ _ ( ) _ ( ) ,     ∀∈ , ∈ . 
(7)
With power at signal t, the signal is operational under scenario s 
( ( ) = 1) if the signal is undamaged or repaired. 
( ) = 1 − 1 − ( ) 1 − ( ) _ _ _ ( ), ∀ ∈ ,
∈ . 
(8)
3.1.2 Budget Limitation 
Constraints (9) are the budget constraints, which limit the number of mitigation, 
preparedness and response actions that can be taken to prevent or ameliorate event 
impact. Costs include taking mitigation or preparedness actions to: substations (e.g. 
placing a backup generator), traffic signals (e.g. providing signals with backup solar 
power), roadway links (e.g. hardening bridges or piers), and repairing damaged 
substations, traffic signals, roadway links and transmission lines. Costs are also 
incurred for assigning a police officer to an intersection for the purpose of directing 







captured by way of parameters that connect such activities: , , and . 
+ ( ) + _ − ( ) 
+ + ( ) + _ − ( ) 
+ + ( ) + _ − ( ) 
+ ( ) + ( ) ≤ , ∀ ∈ . 
(9)
3.1.3 Traffic Flow and Link Capacities 
Constraints (10)-(11) determine path flows between O-D pairs. Constraints (12) 
compute the new capacity of link v for each scenario s considering the resilience 
enhancing actions taken to that link. For simplicity, any mitigative action is presumed 
to ensure the protection of half of the link’s capacity, but a recovery action will return 
the capacity to its initial value. Link flows are assumed to be continuous variables with 
no preset upper capacity limit. 
( ) = , ( )∈∈ ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (10)( )∈ = ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (11)( ) = − ∆ 1 − ( ) 1 − ( )
− ∆ − ∆ 1 − ( ) (1 − ) 1 − ( ) ,     ∀ ∈ ,∈ . 
(12)
3.1.4 KKT Conditions 







et al., 1956) in a lower-level problem are given by constraints (13)-(15). The 
uniqueness of the solution to the equivalent UE problem, in which KKT conditions are 
used, is guaranteed if the following conditions hold: (∙)⁄ = 0 for ≠  and ( )⁄ > 0, ∀  (Sheffi, 1985), for (∙) and  the link performance function 
and traffic flows on link , respectively. Larsson and Patriksson (1995) proved that the 
KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for optimality in a bilevel program 
with a UE formulation at the lower level. ( ) ∙ ( ) − ( ) = 0,    ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (13)( ) − ( ) ≥ 0,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (14)( ) ≥ 0,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ . (15)
3.1.5 Link Travel Times 
Link travel times are computed through constraints (16) and (17). For simplicity, these 
constraints are written assuming each link terminates in a traffic signal. The link travel 
time functions consist of two components: the well-known Bureau of Public Roads 
(BPR) function and additional delay. The BPR function captures the travel time due to 
vehicle movements under recurrent conditions. Additional delay ( _ ) is 
included to account for the effects on traffic of outages at the signals. If a signal is 
operative (i.e. ( ) = 1) or a police officer is assigned to regulate traffic through 








( ) = 1 + 0.15 ( )( ) + _ 1 − , ( )
+ − _ , ( ) 1
− , ( ) , ∀ ∈ − , ∈ , 
(16)
( ) = 1 + 0.15 ( )( ) + _ 1 − , ( )
+ − _ , ( ) 1
− , ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . 
(17)
 
3.1.6 Link Status 
Constraints (18) determine the final link states. If a link is either undamaged by the 
event (i.e. ( ) = 1) or at least one resilience enhancing action was taken on it (i.e. = 1 or ( ) = 1), it will be set as “up.” Some set of links are always operative 
(i.e ( ) = 1) as set by constraints (19); they do not belong to the vulnerable 
set of links for the given scenario type. Additional constraints can be included to 
prevent the model from taking preparedness or recovery actions on functioning links 
when excess budget is available, e.g. ∀ ∈ , ∈ : ( ) + ( ) ≤ 1, and 
likewise, ( ) + ≤ 1.  
( ) = 1 − 1 − ( ) ∙ (1 − ) ∙ 1 − ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (18)







3.1.7 Repair Operations Limitations 
Constraints (20) determine which paths from the depot to the location of the affected 
components are open. Repair operations can only be performed if at least one open path 
is available for the repair crew to reach the affected area (constraints (21) to (23)). It is 
assumed that all repair actions can be completed instantaneously as long as the sites are 
accessible (constraints (20) to (23)). 
∆ , ( )∈ − ∆ ,∈ ℎ ( ) = 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (20)
( ) ≤ , ℎ ( )∈∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (21)
( ) ≤ , ℎ ( )∈∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (22)
( ) ≤ , ℎ ( )∈∈ , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (23)
Binary integrality is enforced through the remaining constraints: ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈  ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈  ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈  ( ) ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈  ( ) ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈  ( ) ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈  ( ) ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈  
_ ( ) ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈  







3.2 Linear approximation 
The resilience formulation is highly non-linear and non-convex. Nonlinear constraints 
associated with complementarity and multi-linear terms can be replaced with 
equivalent linear equations, although with the addition of binary variables. This is 
described in Subsections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. Obtaining a globally optimal solution to this 
equivalent problem proved to be impractical, in part because of remaining nonlinearity 
in the objective function. Thus, the application of linear approximation techniques for 
this purpose is suggested (Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). 
3.2.1 Linearizing the objective function 
Objective function (1) seeks to minimize the expected total system travel time over all 
scenarios using link travel times that are a function of link flows. This creates a non-
linear and non-convex function. An equivalent linear function (26) can replace 
objective function (1).  This equivalency was shown in (Wang and Lo, 2010) and is 
extended here to multiple scenarios. As for every scenario a user equilibrium 
assumption is made, O-D travel times along used paths are thus identical at ( ). 
Given an inelastic demand assumption, the expected total system travel time can be 
rewritten in terms of constant O-D demand, , and O-D travel time, ( ), as in (24). 
 = ( )∈  (24)
3.2.2 Linearizing the BPR function 







(17) using the BPR function. The BPR function is a quartic, bivariate function. 
Numerous earlier works have presented techniques for linearizing this function; 
however, in these works capacities are constant terms. Here, capacities may vary under 
potential hazard impact events. Moreover, they are discrete, taking on one of three 
values (0, half of full capacity, and full capacity) and decision-dependent (a function 
of chosen mitigative and recovery actions). Thus, to linearize the BPR function, it is 
essential to partition the feasible domain of link flows, , into smaller portions. 
Following Wang and Lo (2010), the feasible domain of flows along each link ( ( )) 
is partitioned into Φ small regions:  ≤ ( ) < , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (25)
where ’s are pre-specified parameters ( = 1,2, … , Φ − 1). 
 
The feasible domain of capacity ( ), however, consists of three possible 
values: 0, /2, and . That is, the entire region is divided into Φ*3 small regions. 
The non-linear BPR function then can be approximated by a first-order Taylor series 
for each of these regions: 
 ̃ ( ) = ( )| , ( ) + ( )| , ( ) ∗ ( ) −= ( )| , ( ) − ( )| , ( ) ∗ + ( )| , ( )∗ ( ) = , + , ∙ ( ), 
(26)







, , ,  pre-specified parameters equal to ( )| , ( ) − ( )| , ( ) ∗
 and ( )| , ( ), respectively. 
Through constraints (27), if ( ) ≥  then ( ) = 0, and if ( ) <  then ( ) = 1. 
− ∙ ( ) ≤ ( ) − ≤ ∙ 1 − ( ) − , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , = 1,2, … (27)
( ) = ( ) − ( ), ∀ , , = 1,2, … (28)
Constraints (27) and (28) together determine the region in which ( ) falls: 
 ≤ ( ) <            ( ) = 0, ( ) = 1,≤ ( )            ( ) = 0, ( ) = 0,( ) <            ( ) = 1, ( ) = 1.  
 
For the first case, as shown, ( ) lies in the range , , and according 
to constraints (29), ( ) = 1. However, for the second and third cases in which ( ) 
lies outside range , , ( ) = 0. 
As capacities are discrete, this linearization approach must be adapted. 
Constraints (29) determine into which group capacity falls. Constraints (30) restrict the 
capacity to be in only one of the groups. 
 ( ) = ( ) ∙ (0) + ( ) ∙ 2 + ( ) ∙ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (29)( ) + ( ) + ( ) = 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (30)
If both ( ) and ( ), in which = 1,2,  3, equal one, then based on 







be used in constraints (32) to determine the approximate travel time, ̃ ( ). In 
constraints (32), , ( ) equals 2, forcing ̃ ( ) to be equal to , + , ∙ ( ). 
 , ( ) = ( ) + ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ , = 1,2, … , = 1,2,3. (31)
− ∙ 2 − , ( ) ≤ ̃ ( ) − , + , ∙ ( ) ≤ ∙ 2 − , ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈, = 1,2, … , = 1,2,3. 
(32)
In short, given a link’s flow-capacity settings, travel time is computed based on the 
relevant segment in the linear approximation of the BPR function. A more precise 
approximation can be obtained by dividing the feasible domain of link flows, , into 
very small portions. Doing so, however, will increase the number of variables and 
running times. 
3.2.3 Linearizing complementarity constraints 
Two sets of complementarity constraints must be linearized, the first of which is 
associated with replacing the lower-level problem with its KKT conditions and the 
second of which is associated with repair availability. Constraints (13)-(15) are 
replaced with equivalent constraints (33)-(37). Their equivalencies are shown in 
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981). In constraints (33), if ( ) = 0, then ( ) will 
be zero, and travel time of path  connecting O-D pair , ( ), can take any positive 
value (constraint (33)). On the other hand, if ( ) = 1, then ( ) will be any 
positive value, and ( ) will be equal to ( ) according to constraints (34). These 







( ) − ( ) ≤ ∙ 1 − ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (34) ( ) − ( ) ≥ 0,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (35)( ) ≥ 0,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (36)( ) ∈ 0,1 ,     ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ . (37)
Using similar logic, constraints (20) are replaced with constraints (38) and (39): 
∆ , ( )∈ − ∆ ,∈ ≤ ∙ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ , (38)ℎ ( ) + ( ) ≤ 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ . (39)
3.2.4 Other constraints 
The binary constraints (2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 18 and relevant portions of 16 and 17) can 
be restated as equivalent linear equations. These linear equivalent equations were not 
originally presented, because they are more difficult to interpret. This method is 
presented through an example. Consider constraints (2). This equation determines 
whether or not power can be expected at feeder . If substation  is down (i.e. ( ) = 0), and no recovery or preparedness actions were taken, then _ ( ) 
must be zero. However, if a recovery or preparedness action was taken, then 
_ ( ) must be one ( ,  determines which substation provides power for the 
feeder under consideration). An equivalent linear form is thus given in (40). This 
constraint states that if substation  goes down (i.e. ( ) = 0) and no recovery or 
preparedness action was taken, then _ ( ) is zero. If, on the other hand, at 







_ ( ) ≤ 1 or 2. Since the objective seeks a minimum solution, _ ( ) 
will be set to one. 
_ ( ) ≤ , ( ) + , + , ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (40)







Chapter 4: Illustrative Example 
4.1 Case study 
To demonstrate its applicability and provide a numerical example, the proposed model 
was applied on a network representation built from a real-world coupled electric power- 
traffic system in a section of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Power is generated, transmitted 
and distributed to end users through a three-stage process depicted in Figure 2. In the 
first stage, power is generated at a power plant through the use of fossil fuels, such as 
coal, oil, and natural gas, or renewable sources, including solar, wind, and hydropower.  
 
 
Figure 2- Simplified electric power system 
To transmit the power to spatially disparate end-user locations, the power is transmitted 
at a high voltage using power transformers at transmission (step-up) substations to 
reduce losses incurred during transmission. It is later decreased to a lower voltage at 
distribution substations and then distributed to end users along transmission lines. A 
power drum located near the end users further reduces the voltage to 120V (in the U.S.) 







distribution stage, which involves the distribution (step-down) substations, 
transmission lines (held up by power poles or buried underground), and end users. 
The chosen geographic location for the case study is depicted in Figure 3, and 
the network representation of the roadway network is shown in Figure 4. Only major 
and minor arterial links, along with their intersections, all of which are signalized, are 
included. Tables 2 and 3 list the link attributes and OD-based demand estimates, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3- Case Study Area (South Minneapolis), map created using ESRI’s ArcGIS® 
10.3 
 







     Table 2- Link Attributes 
Link ID Free flow travel time, minutes ( ) 
Capacity, 
vehicles per 
hour ( ) 
1 0.33 1500 
2 0.33 1500 
3 0.62 1500 
4 0.62 1500 
5 0.75 1500 
6 0.75 1500 
7 0.75 1500 
8 0.75 1500 
9 0.94 3000 
10 0.94 3000 
11 1.49 1500 
12 1.49 1500 
13 1.42 5400 
14 1.42 5400 
15 1.68 1500 
16 1.68 1500 
17 1.40 1500 
18 1.40 1500 
19 0.34 1500 
20 0.34 1500 
 
 
          Table 3- O-D pair details 
O-D pair ID Origin node Destination node 
Demand, 
vehicles per hour 
1 1 8 3000 
2 6 3 3000 
 
This portion of Minneapolis is primarily fed by four main substations: 
Southtown, Aldrich, Elliot Park and Main Street (Figure 5). These substations serve 
23, 12, 3, and 1 feeders, respectively, along transmission lines. The coupling of traffic 







users in the power network, and access for repair operations associated with a damaged 
power network. The case study region is served by the Southtown substation and 
involves 5 feeders with 13 transmission lines. A single repair crew is presumed to be 
located at an intersection (node 6) and, for simplicity of example, is capable of 
completing repairs to either system. The coupled network representation is presented 
in Figure 6. 
The coupled system was evaluated under four hypothetical scenarios, each with 
different affected components (substation, traffic signal, transmission line, or roadway 
link). Components are assumed to be up or down. Damage is depicted through 
reduction in roadway link capacities, introduction of travel delays due to signal loss 
(whether from power outage or physical damage), and power loss to the substation or 
inability to transmit power due to physical damage to transmission lines. Affected 
components under each scenario are highlighted in Figure 7. Appendix A provides a 








Figure 5- Substations Service Areas (Zima, 2009) 
 









Figure 7- 4 scenarios (damaged components in dashed lines) 
 
4.2 Experimental Design 
The resilience of the coupled network was evaluated under a variety of settings, 
including varying levels of budget ranging from 0 to $130,000 at $10,000 increments 
and different repair options (repairs to both systems, repairs to only the power network, 
repairs to only the transportation network and those that preclude a specific repair type). 
This required 44 runs of the model given the possibility of any of the four scenarios 







no-damage state to assess the performance of the coupled system under normal 
conditions. This assessment was used to provide a baseline for the analysis and 
resilience computations. To demonstrate the importance of considering a stochastic 
setting, an additional four runs of the model were completed, each on a single, 
deterministically known scenario of the four potential scenarios. 
4.3 Analysis of Run Results 
Run results provide network-level resilience estimates by budget level (Figure 8), 
performance of the coupled system wherein expenditures are limited to only one 
network (Figure 9), and performance under restricted repair situations (Figure 10). 
Figure 8 demonstrates the impact of budget size on performance of the coupled system. 
As expected, performance increases with greater investment and the rate of increase 
levels out at higher budget levels. The system returns to the pre-event performance 
level (i.e. a resilience level of 1.0) at a budget of $130,000 despite that remaining 








Figure 8- Resilience by budget level 




1 2 3 4 
0 37.5% 50.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
20 25.0% 12.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
40 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 37.5% 
60 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 
80 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
100 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.5% 
120 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 
130 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 37.5% 
 
In a deeper investigation of power network performance, unmet demand in 
terms of end-user power needs is considered for each possible scenario (Table 4) given 
resilience-enhancing actions taken for the multi-hazard problem. For the purpose of 
this analysis, an equal power demand is associated with each intersection (a power 







control devices at that intersection and nearby end-users. In scenarios 2 and 3, 
performance of the power network improves with increasing budget level; however, 
this is not the case for scenarios 1 and 4 wherein increasing the budget improves traffic 
network performance but results in no significant reduction in unmet demand for the 
power network. This may be explained as follows. Under scenarios 1 and 4, the need 
for power to the traffic signals is eliminated through the application of alternative 
energy sources (e.g. solar panels and back-up batteries) at the individual intersections. 
Such practices are only possible at higher budget levels due to high equipment costs. 
Figure 9 provides resilience estimates for each budget increment under three 
expenditure-related options: (1) investments made to only the traffic network; (2) 
investments made to only the power network; and (3) investments applied across 
networks with a goal of optimal traffic performance. The former two options depict a 
special situation wherein network operators of these two systems work in isolation 
spending the available budget to maximize the resilience level of the transportation 
network. The results show that for the given hypothetical scenarios, investment in the 
transportation network is most critical, and using some budget for the power network 
is most important at lower budget levels. Since the traffic network relies on power for 
only the operation of its traffic signals (whose loss causes travel delays), and given the 
option to add alternative (e.g. solar) power to each intersection through pre-event 
investment, the higher the budget, the less reliant the coupled system is on the power 
network. Similar behavior was noted in the investigation under individual scenarios in 







be possible to fully restore traffic-network performance without repairs to the power 
network, the impact of investment in the power network will be more crucial.  
 
Figure 9- Resilience by strategy: distributing budget between networks 
Table 5- Total post-disaster unmet power demand by scenario with budget available 
only to transportation network 
Budget 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 
0 37.5% 50.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
 
Table 6- Total post-disaster unmet power demand by scenario and budget level (in 




1 2 3 4 
0 37.5% 50.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
20 37.5% 37.5% 0.0% 62.5% 
40 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
60 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 




























100 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
120 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
130 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
To provide additional insight, the performance of the power network in terms 
of unmet demand where the budget is applied to only the transportation network or the 
power network, but not both, was studied (Tables 5 and 6). The tables show that unmet 
power demand remained constant for all budget levels when the total budget is applied 
exclusively to the transportation network (Table 5).  Moreover, despite that there is no 
improvement in transportation system performance when the budget is dedicated to the 
power network (Table 6), unmet power demand was greatly diminished with greater 
available budget despite an investment objective that aims to improve traffic network 
performance. 
Figure 10 presents system resilience level under limited repair operations. The 
figure shows that traffic signals have the greatest impact on travel times, and thus their 
operability, should be prioritized. While generally the operability of transportation 
links directly influences travel time, there is no scenario considered herein in which 
damage to links causes a situation that changes path choice or that significantly impacts 
connectivity. Of course, these results are specific to the example scenarios designed 
herein, and it might be the case in some situations that transportation links (power 
equipment) have the greatest impact for the performance of the coupled system. 
Next, resilience-enhancing actions are chosen under individual scenarios, 
creating four independent, deterministic optimization problems. Results from runs of 







“deterministic runs.” The figure indicates that a fully-functional coupled network (with 
a focus on the traffic network) is achieved under scenarios 1 and 3, but performs poorly 
under scenario 4. In this latter scenario, the budget is not large enough to counter the 
impacts of the more extreme event depicted through this scenario. These sets of runs 
show the sensitivity of a resilience index to the scenario specification. Thus, resilience 
to an uncertain future may be under- or over-estimated by considering a single scenario, 
warranting the need for a stochastic approach. 
 
Figure 10- Resilience level under restricted repair opportunities 
The resilience level when taking resilience-enhancing actions to achieve the 
optimal expected performance (i.e. the stochastic model) is 0.633 (on a scale of 0 to 1). 



















no repair to signals no repair to transportation links








((1.0+0.821+1+0.341)/4=0.790), each obtained from solution of the deterministic 
problem assuming perfect information about the scenario. The difference between these 
two values is 0.157 and is defined as the expected value of perfect information (EVPI). 
Converting the value of resilience to an equivalent cost, the EVPI can be interpreted as 
the maximum amount of money that transportation managers should be willing to pay 
for perfect predictions of future hazard events and their impacts. For this purpose, a 
monetary conversion of total travel time using value-of-time estimates for drivers can 
be obtained.  
The common value of the stochastic solution (VSS) cannot be obtained given 
the binary nature of damage impact under each scenario. However, how far from 
optimal the solutions would be if pre-event preparedness/mitigative actions were taken 
assuming the occurrence of only one of the possible scenarios but allowing for post-
event (repair) actions under whichever scenario is realized can be considered. 
Practically, optimal first-stage (mitigative/preparedness) decisions from each of the 
four deterministic optimization problems described in the previous paragraph are fixed, 
creating four new stochastic models with only second-stage options. In comparing 
these results in Figure 11 (“fixed pre-event actions”), it is noted that if first-stage 
decisions are taken to hedge against only scenario 4, the resilience level given equal 
probability of any of the scenarios actually arising would fall to 0.511 from 0.633 (i.e. 
by 12.2 percentage points). Results from runs of each of these models assuming a 
budget of $40,000 for both first and second-stage actions are provided in Figure 11. At 







deterministic problem instances. A similar set of runs completed with a budget of 
$80,000 shows this difference using scenario 4 as the base for determining the first-
stage decision to be 23.2 percentage points. At other budget levels this difference may 
be smaller. By definition, however, resilience will be largest if first-stage decisions are 
flexible (unconstrained) and aim to hedge against all possible futures, and not only the 
worst-case. 
 
Figure 11- The value of considering stochasticity and perfect information 
(Budget=$40,000) 
 The results provided in this chapter are based on the hypothetical damage 
scenarios and resulting damage impact (e.g. added delays). The main purpose of this 
chapter was to assess and demonstrate the applicability of the proposed modeling 
approach for coupled lifelines though a detailed numerical example. The application of 
the model showed that to obtain the highest resilience possible, the shared budget must 




















Original two-stage stochastic problem







also showed how the resilience of the transportation systems (a roadway network here) 
could be over- or under-estimated by: (1) disregarding the impact of damage to the 
power network or the effect of repair operations performed on its damaged components 












Chapter 5:  Conclusions, Limitations and Extensions 
 
Capturing the interdependencies between the coupled traffic and power distribution 
networks in transportation resilience quantification and maximization is critical. This 
work provides a mathematical approach employing intersystem variables and coupling 
equations based on logical intersystem connections to capture these interdependencies 
and investigate coupled-system performance under multiple hazards. Generally 
speaking, interconnectivity variables and equations fall into one of four categories: 
node-to-node (electric power present at traffic signals), node-to-link (loss of power 
demand from traffic signals may lead to imbalances in the power distribution network 
and ultimately loss of electric power along a transmission line), link-to-node (repair to 
damaged components located at a node requires a set of links with reasonable travel 
times), and link-to-link (electric power required for rail-line operations) connections. 
A review of the literature indicates that prior published works involving coupled 
transportation systems have focused primarily on vulnerability assessment and 
restoration. This work provides a methodology for resilience measurement. It integrates 
identification of pre- and post-event actions for optimizing coupled-transportation-
system performance under multiple hazard event possibilities. Such a comprehensive, 
quantitative approach is absent from prior works in the published literature. 
A number of potential improvements or extensions may be of interest. In 
particular, an exact decomposition method might be applied that would decompose the 







processing in its solution. Exact solution via integer L-shaped decomposition may also 
be promising for the proposed problem. For large, real-world instances, a heuristic 
could solve larger problem instances considered under significantly more scenarios 
than explored in the case study herein. Solution via a commercial solver or other exact 
technique can provide a benchmark for evaluating the solution quality of such a 
heuristic on small instances. 
Herein, a single repair team is presumed to be present at a single, known 
location and capable of all repair activities. In a second extension, one might consider 
multiple, heterogeneous repair teams that are stochastically located over the network. 
Furthermore, repairs are assumed to be completed instantaneously if the repair crew 
can access the location. Time for traveling to the repair site and service times could be 
included in a third extension. Such consideration would necessitate the need for a time-
dependent network representation such as was employed in (Zhang and Miller-Hooks, 
2014) in the context of resilience quantification and optimization for a single 
(uncoupled) transportation system. Alternatively, a multistage stochastic program 
could be adopted. 
In a fourth possible extension of this work, an objective function that explicitly 
considers unmet power demand may be of interest. A single, additive function of total 
travel time and unmet power demand may be employed or, alternatively, a multi-
objective or goal-programming approach may be desirable. 
A last extension might involve a more detailed power flow model. The 







well-known, linear direct current (DC) power flow approach is applied to approximate 
actual power flows (Andersson, 2004). Such an approach would enable connections 
between loss of power demand and a power outage that are not required for this 
application, but might be useful in a larger, urban context. 
Notation 
Sets  
 set of power nodes including substations, , and signals, , and slack 
bus, ; ⊆  




,  susceptance matrix; = ∑ , ∙ ,∈ , ∀ , ∈  
 ,  network transfer matrix; = ∙ , , ∀ ∈ , ∈
 
 ( ) capacity of transmission line ∈  under scenario ∈  
 _ ( ) maximum power generation at substation ∈  under scenario ∈  
 




( ) power availability as a consequence of injection and demand at power 
node ∈  under scenario ∈  
 ( )  voltage angle at power node ∈  under scenario ∈  
 ( ) electric power flow along the transmission line ∈  under scenario ∈  








( ) unserved load at traffic signal ∈  under scenario ∈  
 ( ) auxiliary variable indicating state of shortfall in scenario ∈  for 
node ∈  




To calculate power flow resulting from a certain generation-load combination, 
the DC load flow model requires information on the Power Transfer Distribution Factor 
(PTDF) (Delaure et al., 2007). The PTDF can be derived from the product of network 
susceptance matrix ,  and voltage angle  as in (41). ( ) = ∑ , ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (41)
The power moving through the transmission lines can be controlled by altering 
the voltage at a node, the impedance between the nodes and the angle between the 
terminal voltages. Constraints (42) define the power flow on the transmission lines in 
terms of their susceptances and phase angles: ( ) = ∑ , ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (42)
The power variable at substations is limited by the maximum capacity, which 
depends on the state of substation ( ) and recovery action ( ), as well as 
additional capacity ∆  in cases where preparedness action ( ) is taken. 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ _ ( ) ( ) + ( ) + ∆ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (43)
The flows on the power transmission lines are limited in constraints (44) to (47). 







− ( ) ≤ _ ( ) + ( ) ∗ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (45)
( ) ≤ _ ( ) + ( ) ∗ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (46)
− ( ) ≤ _ ( ) + ( ) ∗ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (47)
The following constraints limit the application of recovery actions to 
substations that are damaged.  ( ) + ( ) ≤ 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (47)
_ ( ) + ( ) ≤ 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (48)
_ ( ) + ( ) ≤ 1, ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (49)
Constraints (50) account for the impact of preparedness actions on substation 
send-out capacity enhancement. For a subset of feeders, , and their associated traffic 
signals, additional capacity, ∆ , can be added by taking preparedness action . 
However, for other feeders, ( − ), retaining even the initial capacity if the 
substation is damaged can only be achieved by taking a recovery action as depicted in 
constraints (50). ( ) forces power to be zero at those traffic signals that cannot 
receive power due to direct damage or damage to transmission lines that distribute 
power or even damage to substation that is supposed to provide power for that signal. 







, ( ) ≤ , ∗ ,∈ ∗ ( )∗ _ ( ) ∗ ( ) + ( ) + ∆ ( )
+ , ∗ ,∈ ∗ ( )∗ _ ( ) ∗ ( ) + ( ) , ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ . 
(50)
Slack buses are defined in constraints (51) for DC load flows1: − ∙ ( ) = 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (51)
Constraints (52) ensure adherence to Kirchhoff’s law of energy conservation. ( ) = ( ) ∙ ( ) + ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (52)
Constraints (53) specify power consumed at traffic signal : ( ) ≤ 0, ∀ ∈ , ∈ . (53)
Dependencies between substations and signals are modeled through logical 
constraints (54)-(56). These constraints determine if the unmet demand for power is 
positive. If it is positive, then no power is available to meet the demand at traffic signal 
 and traffic signal t will be nonfunctional. ( ) represents the shortfall in power under scenario s. ( ) 
indicates the state of shortfall in scenario s at traffic signal t. ( ) acts as a control 
switch for this state. When ( ) is greater than 0, ( ) must be 1. Thus, ( ) along with  and ( ) determine the final state of this traffic signal t: ( ). 
                                                 








( ) ≤ ∗ ( ), ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (54)( ) ≥ ( )  ∀ ∈ , ∈ , (55)
( ) = 1 − ( ) ∗ 1 − ∗ 1 − 1 − ( ) ∗ 1 − ( )  ∀
∈ , ∀ ∈ .  
(56)













Table 7- Damage level by component for each scenario (1=functional, 0=damaged) 
Component ID 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 
Substation 1 1 1 1 0 
Traffic 
Signals 
4 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 
6 1 0 1 0 
8 0 1 0 0 
9 1 0 1 0 
11 0 1 1 1 
12 1 1 0 0 
13 1 1 0 1 
Roadway 
Links 
14 1 1 0 1 
15 1 0 1 0 
20 1 0 1 0 
21 1 1 0 0 
25 1 1 1 0 
26 1 1 1 0 
27 0 1 0 1 
28 1 0 1 1 
Transmission 
Lines 
1 1 1 1 0 
2 1 0 1 1 
4 1 1 1 0 
5 0 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 0 
10 1 0 1 1 
11 1 1 1 0 
12 0 1 1 1 
13 1 1 0 1 
15 0 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 0 
18 1 1 1 0 
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